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The British, specifically the English, are widely regarded as awkward 
partners in the European project. Much of the criticism has come from anti-
European integration politicians. Now that the outcome of the 2015 general 
election for the United Kingdom Parliament is known the United Kingdom is 
likely to face a referendum by 2017 on exit (Brexit) from the European 
Union. The Conservative Party is also anxious to withdraw from the 
European Convention on Human Rights. Criticism of European influence on 
our law has also surfaced among senior judges but in a far more principled 
way than among politicians. In this article the author analyses the attitude 
of senior judges towards European law and integration. The judicial desire 
to establish UK constitutional space in the relationship with EU law has 
accompanied the emergence of a constitutional jurisprudence shaping the 
UK’s modern unwritten constitution. Our constitution has become far more 
judicialised. Despite the criticism witnessed in recent case law, the UK judges 
are constructive and cooperative in our legal relationship with Europe. 
 
Sommario:   1. Attitudes to Europe; 2. Competences; 3. A 
Growing Circumspection; 4. Fundamental Rights; 5. Constitutional 
Identity; 6. Conclusion  
 
Attitudes to Europe 
 
‘The English, the English, the English are best. I wouldn’t give tuppence for all 
the rest.’1  
 
I hope to convince you that our judges do not share this sentiment although, 
sadly, rather too many politicians in England (sic) do. The antipathy is not shared 
                                                          
* An earlier version of this paper was delivered at the Wissenschaftlichen Gesellschaft für 
Europarecht Berlin November 28 2014. I am grateful to Professors Hatje and Muller-Graff for 
their kind invitation and hospitality.  
1 M.Flanders and D. Swann (1963) ‘A song of Patriotic Prejudice’ (tongue in cheek English 
humour) from At the Drop of a Hat (1963) cited by Lord Neuberger President of the UK 
Supreme Court in ‘The British in Europe’ https://www.supremecourt.uk/docs/speech-
140212.pdf  The entertainers were poking fun at the Irish, Scottish and Welsh, and also the 
English in a manner not deemed politically correct today. 
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in Scotland, Wales or Northern Ireland. Too many English politicians are making 
fools of themselves. If I may borrow from our great poet William Wordsworth 
‘Churchill thou shouldst be living at this hour: thy country hath need of thee.’ 
We English lack leadership and direction on Europe. 
 
Lord Neuberger, President of the UK Supreme Court, has written on Britain and 
Europe. Prediction he writes is very difficult – especially about the future!2 
 
English judges used to be guided on extra judicial utterances by the Kilmuir 
rules, named after a former Lord Chancellor. This was to prevent publicity that 
might compromise their impartiality. Judges, Neuberger continues, must be 
wary of entering the political debate. But when the debate concerns the ‘legal 
system or rule of law’ there is a duty to speak out.  
 
Neuberger accounts for England’s traditional grumpiness towards Europe. 
Unlike most European countries, Great Britain, he writes, has witnessed 
territorial integrity since the 13th century (his claim could not be true of the 
United Kingdom and the disputed claims over Ireland); there has been an 
absence of invasion, and an absence of revolution since the seventeenth century 
(for the United Kingdom there is, however, the Irish rebellion of 1916). England 
has had to come to terms with post imperial decline and we possess a national 
religion with the Monarch as its head – it is not a Catholic country. But we are 
not alone in not being a ‘Catholic country’. Indeed he believes that a good deal of 
English Eurosceptism emerges from anti-Catholicism, a view which personally I 
do not share.  
 
We in the UK have placed greater reliance on the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR) than have most other European Union countries. The 
Convention is deeply unpopular with large sections of the popular press and 
influential figures in the Conservative Party would like to see the UK leave the 
Council of Europe and replace the ECHR with a ‘domestic Bill of Rights.3 Indeed 
the Attorney General Dominic Grieve was sacked in the summer of 2014 
because of his support for the ECHR.4 On top of all these things there is a world 
of difference between the techniques of the common law – where judges make 
                                                          
2 See Neuberger above and also http://supremecourt.uk/docs/speech-141009-lord-
neuberger.pdf  
 
3 See Protecting Human Rights in the UK (2014) 
http://www.theguardian.com/politics/interactive/2014/oct/03/conservativ
es-human-rights-act-full-document  
4 See D.Grieve ‘Why Human Rights Should Matter to Conservatives.’ 
http://www.ucl.ac.uk/constitution-unit/constitution-unit-news/031214a  
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law but are not legislators - and civil law. Finally, there are our links with the 
USA and Commonwealth. For all these reasons, writes Neuberger, 
 
‘it appears ... unsurprising that mainland European peoples, governments and 
media are more ready than their UK (sic) counterparts to join and to support 
institutions which involve trading a degree of national sovereignty or self-
determination in return for closer mutual cooperation, inter-governmental 
coordination and supra national dispensation of justice.’5  
 
He adds: ‘Our legal history is not one of splendid isolation but one of splendid 
synthesis!’6 Our great constitutional historian, F.W. Maitland, relates how after 
the reign of Edward I English lawyers became more thoroughly ignorant of any 
law but the common law.7 I might add in the year of celebration of Magna Carta 
(1215) that it was a French King who sealed the Charter and most of the Barons 
and Bishops who placed their name on the foundation document of our 
constitution were French. But this is not the era of Lords Scarman, Steyn and 
Bingham, all Europhile judges and internationalists. 
 
We are a weird bunch, we English! We have no written constitution but one 
built on custom and practice and the common law, dualism in the relationship 
between international and domestic law, and a constitutional fundamental 
doctrine of Parliamentary Sovereignty. Our judges have been sedulously working 
out the parameters of the common law constitution and the implications for the 
rule of law. Much has to be unravelled in a very creative period.  
 
Received wisdom is that English judges on the whole will do what Parliament 
tells them to do – that is their constitutional position. It is a part of Parliamentary 
Sovereignty. If ever they ‘controlled’ acts of Parliament it was through statutory 
interpretation, despite the famous, brave and clear words of Coke CJ in Bonham’s 
case in 1610.8 At the end of this paper I add one possible qualification to the 
traditional view of sovereignty. 
 
The 1972 European Communities Act, which laid the legal basis in domestic law 
for our accession to the (now) Union, says basically in s. 2(1) that we give 
expression and realisation to all rights, duties, liabilities etc that the 
Communities (now EU) and the Court of Justice of the EU (ECJ now CJEU) 
create. The Act states in s.2(4) that all future statutes must be interpreted in 
accordance with s 2(1) – a presumption against implied repeal. Furthermore, all 
                                                          
5 Para 19 note 1. 
6  Ibid Para 52. 
7 F.W.Maitland The Constitutional History of England (1955 reprint) p. 21. This is 
certainly true of English land law although other areas of the common law did 
witness a Roman law influence. 
8 (1610) 8 Co Rep 114 (Common Pleas). 
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matters of EU law and rulings of the CJEU are treated as matters and rulings of 
law and binding on domestic judges and not as questions of fact to be proved (s 
3). It must be emphasised that for domestic judges their primary focus is on the 
Act of Parliament and its interpretation, not the EU treaties. This dualistic 
approach is given emphasis in s 18 European Union Act 2011. However, the 
treaties will be referred to as an aid to consistent interpretation with, and 
application of, EU norms (s.3 above). 
 
I am not sure that any English judge conceived in 1973 that the CJEU might get 
it wrong or that Europe might do dreadful things until Sir John Laws in the 
Thoburn judgment (below) posited the limits of what the 1972 Act may authorise. 
In doing so, he suggested limits to what Parliament itself may authorise as well as 
limits on Parliament’s own powers under the common law! Pandora’s box was 
opened! 
 
The theme on which I write has moved from ignorance of the European 
enterprise – as witness the Lord Chancellor in 1967 stating that EEC law ‘only 
affected institutions and corporations’; it had no effect on individuals!!9 to a call 
to engagement from judges and lawyers by Lord Denning in 1973 – lawyers and 
judges have to learn the new and strange system and new methodologies10 to an 
attitude based on outright hostility. Witness the Lord Chancellor (Secretary of 
State for Justice) but no longer a judge nor head of the judiciary: ‘My views on 
matters European are well known. ... I will not tolerate, the idea of us becoming 
part of a Europeanised justice system."11 It gets worse politically. 
 
Competences 
 
The UK record on consistent construction, sovereignty of EU law, direct effect 
and Art 267 references has, on the whole, been good and Euro friendly. I set this 
out in my chapter in the festschrift dedicated to Jurgen Schwarze.12 In relation to 
Art 267 TFEU references, there have been signs of growing questioning from the 
Supreme Court as we shall see.  
 
In the beginning, that is after 1973, the approach was constructive and 
enterprising and never better expressed than by Lord Denning (above). 
                                                          
9 House of Lords, 8th May, 1967; Vol. 282, c. 1203, Lord Gardiner. 
10 Bulmer v Bollinger [1974] 2 All ER 1226 at 1232 b 
11 House of Commons Reports, Column 93, 7 April 2014: Justice Secretary 
Grayling. 
12 P. Birkinshaw ‘The United Kingdom in Europe and Europe in the United Kingdom – an 
Indelible Influence’ in Verfassung und Verwaltung in Europa  eds U Becker, A Hatje, M Potacs, N 
Wunderlich, Nomos Baden-Baden pp 19-42 (2014). 
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Factortame No 2(1991)13 was the first occasion on which the impact of EC 
sovereignty became apparent – after initial reluctance – and compelled British 
courts to acknowledge the full implications of the new legal order that the UK 
had signed up to and voluntarily agreed to. The government had passed through 
Parliament legislation in 198814 to undermine the Common Fisheries policy in a 
manner that was blatantly discriminatory under EU law. The use of primary 
legislation was also deliberately chosen to prevent judicial challenge. Not only 
did the House of Lords Judicial Committee disapply parts of an Act of Parliament 
– for the first time ever. It also fashioned relief against the secretary of state as an 
officer of the Crown by way of injunction which the top court had never done 
before but which it soon extended to litigation not concerned with EU law.15 
The Law Lords refused to give relief against the Crown in right of the 
Department for Transport, Home Office etc because of sensitivities about 
impleading the Crown directly.16 The relief operated against the ‘officer of the 
Crown’ on the public law side. 
 
But the analysis of what the new order meant constitutionally and how it 
impacted on Parliamentary sovereignty only came up for judicial analysis and 
clearer, but far from final, elucidation in Thoburn in 2002.17 This case concerned 
the Metric Martyrs. These were market traders who sold their vegetables in 
imperial weights and not metric ones as required by then EC law. The actual 
legal ratio was narrow and technical and turned on the rejection of the argument 
that a later statute had impliedly repealed the 1972 Act in its relevant provisions 
and regulations made thereunder. The traders were rightly convicted.  
 
The judgment given by Sir John Laws argued obiter that EU law was not 
entrenched in our law, as argued by prosecuting counsel, because EU law could 
not do what a statute could not do – entrench itself. EU sovereignty (primacy) 
was operative because the statute said so; but no statute could give away 
overriding sovereignty because that was not in Parliament’s gift. It was in the gift 
of the common law and the common law would not condone such a thing. Laws, 
and most other commentators are not clear in what they mean by the ‘common 
law’. It means at least six things.18 Laws judgment gave an enormous fillip to the 
                                                          
13 Case C 213/89 R v Secretary of State for Transport ex p Factortame Ltd (No 2). 
[1991] 1 All ER 70 (CJEC & HL). And see Equal Opportunities Commission v 
Secretary of State for Employment [1994] UKHL 2. 
14 The Merchant Shipping Act 1988. 
15 M v Home Office [1994] 1 AC 377. 
16 See S.Sedley Ashes and Sparks: Essays on Law and Justice (2011) ch 28.  
17 Thoburn v Sunderland City Council [2002] 4 All ER 156. 
18 The system of government, governance and law introduced by the Normans who adopted 
Anglo-Saxon methods; the procedure of the common law ie trial by jury, adversarial process 
etc; common law as opposed to equity; reasoning by precedent and stare decisis; common law 
as opposed to statutory law; common law as a common system and not divided between public 
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common law constitution interpreted and controlled by the judges. The case also 
supported a higher status ‘constitutional statute’ which could not be subject to 
implied repeal, only express or unmistakably unavoidable (ie express) repeal. 
This was a legal novelty. Laws’ views have recently been given judicial approval 
by the Supreme Court.  
 
We move on. What is apparent from 2011 onwards is that the judiciary are 
reflecting more circumspectly on the national/EU legal and judicial edifice. 
More has been written by English judges on the CHR at Strasbourg – a good deal 
of it critical – than on the EU. The attacks on both the ECHR and the EU have 
focused on the enervating effect of the ECHR on national democracy and 
democratic debate.19 Sir John Laws has accused the EU and ECHR of enfeebling 
the Catholicity of the common law.20 My own belief is that those influences have 
added to the strength of the common law. That Strasbourg does not understand 
the common law has been a frequent criticism. 
 
Some interesting insights into the attitude towards ECJ judges have come from 
extra-judicial writings of two judges from the UK Supreme Court, Lords Mance 
and Neuberger. For Mance ‘The common law has been a world force. But it is a 
minority influence within Europe. But I believe that it has been loyal and effective 
in applying European law.’ The relationship must be based on mutual respect.21  
 
The second paper by Mance on the ‘Interface between National and European 
Law’ is more of a nuts and bolts analysis of the relationship between the ECJ and 
English judges. He raises concerns about accession to the ECHR by the EU. At 
present the UK judges can enter a dialogue with Strasbourg and attempt to get a 
change of direction in Strasbourg. It has done so on several notable occasions. 
However, after EU accession, will ECJ judges engage in over-egging to ‘play 
safe’ ie go further than they may have done in the past? Both sides should be 
allowed to take an ECJ judgment to Strasbourg. A particular problem he 
addresses is Art 267 references and the acte clair doctrine and Köbler liability and 
manifest errors of EU law by national judiciary.  
 
                                                                                                                                           
and civil law. On the latter, public law is now an established part of English law: see Schwartze 
Festschrift note 12. If we add common law as opposed to canon law that makes seven. 
19 Lord Sumption ‘The Limits of Law’ (2013) http://supremecourt.uk/docs/speech-
131120.pdf  
20 Sir John Laws ‘The Common Law and Europe Hamlyn Lectures III (2013) 
http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/JCO/Documents/Speeches/laws-lj-
speech-hamlyn-lecture-2013.pdf  
21 ‘The Rule of Law’ At http://supremecourt.uk/docs/speech-131001.pdf  
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English courts dealt with the latter in Cooper v Att Gen22 a Court of Appeal 
decision on liability of national courts under Köbler. Cooper establishes manifest 
errors to ground judicial liability are most unlikely to be established in relation to 
England.  
 
Mance also criticises the EU legislator for an absence of certainty and 
predictability. His particular targets are the cases of Mangold and Ass Belge Test 
Achats.23 He refers to the German judicial criticism of the ECJ’s ruling in Fransson 
for giving an expansive interpretation to the Charter of Fundamental Rights Art 
51(1).24 I will point out, however, that in the Rugby Union Football case the 
Supreme Court endorsed a broad interpretation to ‘implementing EU law’ and 
gave a generous accommodation to ‘within the sphere of Union law.’25 
 
Neuberger has stated that whatever approaches the UK adopts in relation to the 
EU and ECHR two twin tenets of British constitutionalism must be respected: 
democracy and the rule of law.26   
 
But democracy in the form of representative government is being supplemented 
by participatory forms of plebiscites and, one might add, for instrumental 
political purposes. In the case of the European Union Act 2011 there have to be 
UK plebiscites for future treaty changes to ensure, basically, that there is no 
significant revision of the EU treaties.  Whole rafts of additional EU initiatives 
are caught by the requirement for legislative approval or a vote in approval of 
both Houses. Our constitution has been changed. ‘Oh what a tangled web we 
weave when first we practise to deceive!’  
 
The first challenge under the 2011 Act to attempt to get a ruling from the High 
Court that the Act had not been complied with by the Government came in 
Wheeler and concerned approval of the EAW without a referendum.27 The judge, 
who rejected the application in its entirety, was Leveson LJ who had conducted a 
lengthy inquiry into press culture and who highlighted in his report the 
scandalous untruths told by large sections of the UK press about Europe.28 
 
                                                          
22 [2010] EWCA Civ 464. 
23 Case C-144/04 Mangold v Helm & Case 236/09 Association Belge des Consommateurs Test-Achats 
ASBL and Others v Conseil des ministres 
24 http://supremecourt.uk/docs/speech-130201.pdf  
25 [2012] UKSC 55 and CFR Article 51(1) at para 28. 
26 http://supremecourt.uk/docs/speech-141010.pdf 
27 Wheeler v Prime Minister [2014] EWHC 3815 (Admin) – Leveson LJ 
http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Admin/2014/3815.html  
28 An Inquiry into the Culture, Practices and Ethics of the Press (2012) 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20140122145147/http://www.official-
documents.gov.uk/document/hc1213/hc07/0780/0780.asp  
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Democracy must be accompanied by the separation of powers, which I add, is far 
from fully implemented within the UK, and protection of human rights and 
minorities.  
 
On the rule of law, Mance, as other eminent judges, has emphasised the 
substantive quality of the rule of law. That includes access to justice, protection of 
fundamental rights and arguably the supremacy of law over political and 
economic power – the ability of law to act as a neutral brake on social and 
arbitrary power. Europe has helped us in that regard. But this is derided by much 
of the popular British press. Mance’s paper came at a time when the Justice 
Secretary (Lord Chancellor) is launching an all-out attack on judicial review – an 
attack that was defeated in the House of Lords in October 2014; the successful 
counter-assault was spear-headed by Lord Woolf, a former very eminent judge.29 
 
A growing circumspection 
 
In Walton the Supreme Court – without hearing argument on the point – 
expressed the view that technical breaches of EU law (the Structural 
Environmental Assessment Directive) might not be awarded public law relief in 
UK courts.30 Such relief is discretionary under domestic law and why should 
there be a difference between domestic law and EU law?  
 
A whole raft of cases have shown Supreme Court judges to be less inclined to 
refer matters to the ECJ – HS2 [2014] is the most interesting case (below); 
Walton above was not referred. X v Mid Sussex CAB31 – no reference made on 
whether Directive 2000/78/EC applied disability protection to a ‘volunteer’ and 
not an employee. HMRC v Aimia Coalition – no further reference after initial 
reference drafted by one side’s legal team, with seemingly little input from the 
other side, and then a decision not to accept the ruling of the ECJ on a first 
reference which was made without full consideration of relevant facts and issues 
the Supreme Court ruled! The Supreme Court declined to follow the 
classification of the ECJ. 32 The ECJ ruling was not ‘dispositive of the UK 
Supreme Court’s decision’ although the ruling would provide guidance when the 
full facts were considered by the domestic court.33 Home Office v Tariq – no 
reference because the position was determined by the Strasbourg jurisprudence 
                                                          
29 HL Debs 27 October 2014 cols 952 et seq. 
30 [2012] UKSC 44. See also Sustainable Shetland v Scottish Ministers [2015] UKSC 4 and the Birds 
Directive (2009)/147/EC). However, see Commissioners for HM R&C v Marks and Spencer plc 
[2014] UKSC 11 on support for the full effectiveness to EU rights in domestic law.  
31 [2012] UKSC 59. 
32 HMRC v Aimia Coalition [2013] UKSC 15. See Lord Reed note 66 below.  
33 See note 66 at p 15. 
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(sic) which was clear;34 R (Chester) v SoS Justice35 & Stott v Thomas Cook36 – no 
references made on prisoners’ right to vote under EU law, and EC disability 
rights’ provisions for air transport passengers and preclusion of damages by 
virtue of the Montreal Convention. However, in R (Client Earth) v Secretary of 
State for the Environment etc37& Test Claimants38– references were made. The cases 
concerned the Air Quality Directive and effectiveness of relief under domestic 
law respectively.  
 
In 2012-2014, four references were made by the Supreme Court to the ECJ; 
twenty-six were not referred because the Supreme Court refused permission to 
appeal from the Court of Appeal. From 2001-2013 there were 242 references to 
the ECJ from the UK courts in toto.39 
 
Fundamental Rights 
 
Fundamental and constitutional rights were protected by historical heritage; they 
were not always the same as legal rights.40 Without a written constitution and a 
constitutional court and no domestic jurisprudence on human rights we had no 
focal point to launch a critique as in Solange etc. The ideals of security, liberty 
and property resonate throughout our constitutional history, as does the concept 
of ‘fundamental law’ but in the courts our record on protecting what we today 
term human rights has not been admirable, until recently. Sometimes the writ of 
habeas corpus produced startling examples of security and liberty but for an 
example of a lonely voice seeking to uphold legality in the face of executive 
discretion I can do no better than point you to Lord Atkin’s lonely dissent in 
Liversidge v Anderson [1942]41 in the midst of the second world war. The dissenting 
judgment is a tour de force against unbridled executive powers and executive 
detention. The majority interpreted statutory powers in a manner that recalled 
the Court of King’s Bench under Charles I and its acceptance of the sweeping 
powers of the Crown. Our law has concentrated on writs not rights – said 
Maitland – others say it has concentrated on ‘rites’ (traditional obeisance) not 
writs.  
                                                          
34 [2011] UKSC 35. 
35 [2013] UKSC 63 paras 72-74. 
36 [2014] UKSC 15. 
37 [2013] UKSC 25 and [2015] UKSC 28. 
38 [2012] UKSC 19 
39 See , http://www.supremecourt.uk/docs/annual-report-2013-14.pdf and 
http://www.supremecourt.uk/docs/annual-report-2012-13.pdf and  
 http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2014-
06/qdag14001enc.pdf 
I am grateful to Alison Young for these points. 
40 See J.W.Gough Fundamental Law in English Constitutional History OUP (1955). 
41 [1942] AC 46. 
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I don’t think it would have occurred to all but one or two British judges in 1972 
that the EU (EC etc) could have presented a human rights issue before British 
courts. The first indication is Laws in Thoburn (2002) discussed above. It has 
become more apparent under Charter of Fundamental Rights (CFR),42 Justice 
and Home Affairs43 and the European Arrest Warrant (EAW).44 
 
Judges have accepted that the CFR applies to the UK – even if the exact 
parameters have not been defined.45 Blair’s soi-dissant ‘opt-out’ is no such thing. 
The insulting comparison of one of Blair’s ministers to the CFR being the 
equivalent to the ‘Beano’ (a children’s cartoon magazine in the UK) in its legal 
status was ridiculous.46 Although the legal status of the CFR is accepted, there 
have been critical comments on its status by English judges. In AB47 Mostyn J 
wrote of the CFR as a part of UK law and being far wider than the ECHR in 
terms of shocked surprise.  
 
But this response is very composed when compared with the House of Commons 
EU Scrutiny Committee report in April 2014 – the major recommendation was 
to remove the CFR from our law by UK legislation! It is a recommendation 
coloured by ignorance and discrimination.48 
 
The CFR has featured in a very important domestic case involving Prince Charles 
and access to his correspondence held by government departments.49 The prince 
had been lobbying Ministers for ‘causes’. The information was sought under the 
Freedom of Information Act 2000 (a domestic measure) and the Environmental 
Information Regulations (SI 3391/2004 implementing Council Directive 
2003/4/EC). Under both legal regimes the Attorney General may issue a veto 
                                                          
42 See Rugby Football Union note 25.  
43 S.Peers EU Law Analysis ‘The UK opts back into the EAW and other EU 
Criminal Law’ 1 December 2014: 
http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.co.uk/2014/12/the-uk-opts-back-in-to-
european-arrest.html  
44 Assange v Swedish Prosecution Authority [2012] UKSC 22. 
45 In relation to Art 1(2) Protocol 30. See Joined Cases C-411/10 and C-493/10 NS 
v Secretary of State for the Home Department (21/12/2011) and EM (Eritrea) v. 
Secretary of State for the Home Department [2012] EWCA Civ 1336 paras 43−48. 
Note Benkharbouche etc v Embassy of Sudan [2015] EWCA Civ 33and the 
horizontal direct effect of Art 47 EUCFR paras 76-85. 
46 The Minister was Keith Vaz; see ‘Beano No More’ K.Beal and T.Hickman 
(2011) Judicial Review 113. 
47 R (AB) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2013] EWHC 3452 
(Admin). 
48 EU Scrutiny Committee HC 979 (2013-14). 
49 R (Evans) v Att Gen [2014] EWCA Civ 254. The original tribunal decision is 
[2012] UKUT 313(AAC). 
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overriding decisions by the Information Commissioner and an independent 
tribunal allowing access to the information. The Information Tribunal had ruled 
in favour of disclosure because the Prince had been lobbying Ministers and was 
not engaged in being prepared for monarchy – the later would have been 
protected by confidentiality. The public interest required disclosure. This 
decision was vetoed. 
 
Under the EU EIR the judgment of the Court of Appeal was emphatic in 
rejecting the Attorney General’s veto under the EU implementing regulations on 
behalf of the Prince. Basically, the case for His Royal Highness was defeated by 
the requester’s rights to access to justice under Articles 47 & 52(3) CFR and 
Article 6 ECHR.  
 
The Court of Appeal judgment was upheld by the Supreme Court (R (Evans) v 
Attorney General [2015] UKSC 21) both in relation to domestic law under the 
Freedom of Information Act ((FOIA) five judges from seven) and under the EU 
Directive (six judges). The court did not consider it necessary to refer to 
arguments about the EU Charter. The judgment of Lord Neuberger (with whom 
Lords Kerr and Reed concurred) considered that an executive veto under FOIA 
undermined the binding nature of judicial decisions and that an executive decision 
must be reviewable by a court of law. The FOIA veto was not clear enough to 
override a decision of a judicial tribunal or a court. The scope of a FOIA veto was 
confined. Lord Mance (with Lady Hale) agreed on the outcome but on the 
narrower ground that the Attorney General had not begun to address the Upper 
Tribunal’s cogent reasons for disclosure. Under EU law, Art 6(1), (2) and (3) of 
the Directive required a binding judicial determination and a full merits review 
which a judicial review of the veto could not achieve. This has a very wide ambit. 
The veto was therefore incompatible with the Directive in relation to 
environmental information. The decision of the Upper Tribunal ordering 
disclosure therefore stands under both domestic and EU law. For Lord 
Neuberger, the decision was one upholding the rule of law. 
  
 
The interesting development has come with the common law of human rights 
and the influence, reaction to, the ECHR. We in the UK have to rely upon the 
ECHR much more than you would in Europe to advance human rights. We have 
no written constitutional protection for human rights. The Convention and the 
Human Rights Act resonate throughout our courts. 
 
The emerging common law of human rights is a history without a beginning. It 
emerged, but did not commence, with three very important cases in the 1960s 
(themselves inspired by 17th century case law) and developed in the 1980s with 
growing insistence on extension of jurisdictional grounds to protect individuals. 
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It becomes clearer in the 1990s.50 It is added to by the Human Rights Act 1998 
implementing much of the ECHR into domestic law but that legislation 
fomented a domestic judicial reaction to give clearer identity to a common law of 
human rights.51  
 
The most interesting and dramatic recent example of the common law of human 
rights came in Kennedy v Charity Commission (transparency)52 following HM 
Treasury v Ahmed [2010] (legality, access to justice, property rights).53 The latter 
was overruled by legislation. EU human rights cannot be overruled by UK 
legislation – unless the UK determined to leave the EU. A referendum on such 
an exit has been promised by the Conservative Party who will be bolstered in 
Eurosceptism by any United Kingdom Independence Party MPs after May 2015 
– depending upon election results. 
 
Constitutional Identity 
The leading discussion on ‘identity’ comes with the litigation concerning what is 
known as HS2 and the patriation of constitutionalism. HS2 concerns the 
development of the high speed train routes from London to the Midlands and 
then onto the North of England.54 It is the most ambitious project on land use 
development by the UK government since the Channel Tunnel and the most 
ambitious infrastructure project since the building of the railways in nineteenth 
century Britain.  
The government decided that because of the complexity of the decision and the 
necessity otherwise for planning permission through infrastructure projects’ 
procedures a hybrid bill procedure would be adopted. On introduction in the 
House of Commons, the Bill will be given a First reading. This is a formality, and 
no debate takes place. The principles of the Bill are debated at Second reading 
and then a special Select Committee of Members of Parliament (MPs) also 
established. 
                                                          
50 Note the seminal Derbyshire CC v Times Newspapers Ltd [1993] AC 534, R v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department ex p Simms  [2000] 2 AC 115, R (Daly) v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department [2001] UKHL 26 on freedom of speech, 
privacy, legality and access to justice. 
51 See eg Osborne v Parole Board [2013] UKSC 61 and Kennedy v Charity Commission 
[2014] UKSC 20. 
52 [2014] UKSC 20 
53 [2010] UKSC 2 & 5. 
54 R (HS2 Action Alliance Ltd) v Secretary of State for Transport [2014] UKSC 3. See 
Pham v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2015] UKSC 19 below and 
further patriation of constitutional questions. 
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The Select Committee hears objections (called ‘petitions’) against details of the 
scheme by those directly affected by its proposals, which are made following 
Second reading. The Select Committee can recommend changes to the scheme 
based on petitioner concerns.55 
A Public Bill Committee of MPs then reviews the Bill and may make further 
amendments, after which the Bill enters the Report stage and subsequently 
receives its Third reading. 
A similar process is followed in the House of Lords. The Bill returns to the 
Commons for consideration of amendments made in the Lords and following this 
receives Royal Assent, thus becoming an Act of Parliament. 
This Act of Parliament would provide the powers to construct and maintain 
Phase One of HS2 between London and the West Midlands.56 
Two issues emerged in this litigation. The first was whether the government 
policy Command paper High Speed Rail – Investing in Britain’s Future – Decisions 
and Next Steps (2012) setting out the proposals in outline required a Structural 
Environmental Assessment (SEA) under EU law because the paper had a 
constraining influence on the decisions to be taken. The Supreme Court ruled that 
the Command paper (CM 8247 January 2012 the Decisions and Next Steps) was not 
a constraint on decision-making requiring a SEA under Directive 201/42/EC. 
Despite a lack of clarity in ECJ case law, and a vigorous dissent in the Court of 
Appeal and doubt in the mind of Baroness Hale, the case was not referred to the 
ECJ and followed Walton (above) in this respect.  
 
The second, and more important point concerned the fact that development 
approval was to be given via a hybrid bill procedure in Parliament (above). This 
would involve an opportunity for those affected by the bill to make 
representations to the especially appointed select committees of MPs and Peers 
to make their views known. The argument in short for the claimants was that the 
internal process within Parliament would not give an appropriate examination of 
all the evidence for the proposal required by EU law in the Environmental 
Impact Assessment Directive (2011/92/EU [2012] OJ L26/1). The government 
did not intend the principle behind the bill (the policy) to be challenged within 
proceedings unless required by Parliament after the second reading to do so. 
Furthermore, the government would use a three-line party whip (the means of 
                                                          
55 More information on how to petition can be viewed on the UK Parliament website 
at:www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-select/high-speed-
rail-london-west-midlands-bill-select-committee-commons 
56 The stages of a Bill’s passage through Parliament can be viewed on the UK Parliament 
website at: www.parliament.uk/about/how/laws/passage-bill 
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enforcing party discipline within Westminster) to pressure MPs on the 
government side to vote for approval of the bill. It may be of interest to note that 
the Government exercised a veto over a decision to disclose unpublished papers 
relating to the HS2 project under the Freedom of Information Act (the 
Information Commissioner noted that the EIR should have been used).57 
 
The claimants argued that these proceedings would not allow effective public 
participation as required by Art 6(4) of the 2011 Directive. Art 1(4), however, 
exempted projects adopted by specific act of national legislation since this 
entailed achievement of the objectives of supplying information through a 
representative democratic process.  
 
The claimants countered that the ECJ had ruled that two requirements had to be 
met to achieve compliance with Art 1(4). There must be an examination in 
substance and not merely a formal one; secondly that those participating had to be 
properly informed. Furthermore, MPs, the claimants argued, had to be given a 
free vote and should not be ‘whipped’ by political party enforcers. Additionally, 
national courts, the Advocates General argued, had to review the adequacy of the 
internal procedures to ensure full and proper examination of the issues.58 The 
courts would have to undertake a ‘hard-look’ review of internal Parliamentary 
procedures. 
 
The Supreme Court ruled in favour of the government in refusing to quash the 
decision by the government to proceed with the bill in Parliament. In Lord 
Reed’s judgment for the court, procedures, he ruled, are controlled by 
Parliament not the government. The internal process would be a substantive 
appraisal as required, there was a super-abundance of information available and 
MPs could vote to amend the bill – I add many might be pressured by their 
constituents to do so. Party or governmental influence was not incompatible 
with Art 1(4). The court was satisfied that a procedure would be adopted that 
complied with the Directive. There was no need to make an Article 267 
reference despite uncertainty as to the lack of clarity in EU law. 
 
But it was the ruling in relation to review of Parliament’s internal proceedings 
that seems to emphasise a domestically dominated constitution. The discussions 
raised important points in the relationship between the national constitution and 
the European Union and sovereignty. It revisited and moved on from Factortame 
No 2. Like Thoburn, what follows is obiter. 
 
                                                          
57 See www.parliament.uk/briefing-papers/sn05007.pdf  
58 Advocates General Sharpston in Case C-128/09 Boxus v Regione Wallon and Kokott in Case 
C-43/10 Nomarchiaki Aftodioikisi Aitoloakarnanias etc v Ypourgos Perivallontos etc  
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Basically, Art 9 of the Bill of Rights 1688-89 prohibits questioning the 
proceedings of Parliament ‘in any other place’, in particular the courts. As we 
know, supremacy in most member states is dealt with under national 
constitutional provisions such as Art 23 of the Basic Law of Germany or Arts 55 
and 88 of the French constitution. We have no written constitution. Would EU 
law require a judicial investigation into Parliamentary proceedings as the 
claimants argued to ensure compliance with the Directive?  
 
In the UK, EU supremacy was provided for under s 2(1) EC Act 1972 (above). 
The UK voluntarily accepted the supremacy of EU law, we saw in Factortame. But 
Thoburn ruled that Parliament could not give away its ultimate sovereignty 
because that was not a gift of Parliament; it was the creature of the common law. 
The common law would not allow Parliament to give away its ultimate 
sovereignty to European law. The constitutional relationship between the Union 
and our national constitution was ultimately determined by the common law. I 
quote at length from Lord Reed for a unanimous court. 
 
‘Contrary to the submission made on behalf of the appellants, that 
question cannot be resolved simply by applying the doctrine 
developed by the Court of Justice of the supremacy of EU law, since 
the application of that doctrine in our law itself depends upon the 
terms and interpretation of the 1972 Act. If there is a conflict 
between a constitutional principle, such as that embodied in article 9 
of the Bill of Rights, and EU law, that conflict has to be resolved by 
our courts as an issue arising under the constitutional law of the 
United Kingdom. Nor can the issue be resolved, as was also 
suggested, by following the decision in R v Secretary of State for 
Transport, Ex p Factortame Ltd (No 2) [1991] 1 AC 603, since that case 
was not concerned with the compatibility with EU law of the 
process by which legislation is enacted in Parliament. The Factortame 
case was concerned with the meaning and effects of legislation 
passed by Parliament and their governance by EU law.’ [Para 79]  
 
Against this background, it appears unlikely that the Court of Justice 
intended to require national courts to exercise a supervisory 
jurisdiction over the internal proceedings of national legislatures of 
the nature for which the appellants contend. There is in addition 
much to be said for the view, advanced by the German Federal 
Constitutional Court in its judgment of 24 April 2013 on the 
Counter-Terrorism Database Act, 1 BvR 1215/07, para 91, that as part 
of a co-operative relationship, a decision of the Court of Justice 
should not be read by a national court in a way that places in 
question the identity of the national constitutional order ("Im Sinne 
eines kooperativen Miteinanders zwischen dem 
Bundesverfassungsgericht und dem Europäischen Gerichtshof ... 
darf dieser Entscheidung keine Lesart unterlegt werden, nach der 
diese offensichtlich als Ultra-vires-Akt zu beurteilen wäre oder 
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Schutz und Durchsetzung der mitgliedstaatlichen Grundrechte in 
einer Weise gefährdete ..., dass dies die Identität der durch das 
Grundgesetz errichteten Verfassungsordnung in Frage stellte"). [111 
Lord Reed] 
Come what may, this is an assumption by Lord Reed. Can it really be argued that 
this assumption represents acte clair and did not require a reference?  
Lords Mance and Neuberger (reflecting the unanimity of the court) wrote as 
follows. They were concerned that the Advocate Generals had read ‘since’ in the 
directive of 2011 Art 1(4) to mean ‘provided that’ Parliament undertakes and if I 
may add is seen to undertake a full substantive review. The European Court of 
Justice was itself careful to use a general formulation, invoking the ‘objectives’ of 
the Directive, when it re-interpreted ‘since’ to mean ‘provided that’ in article 
1(5). The Court did not say that the Directive or its provisions applied to a 
specific legislative act. Rather, 
It said that it was a condition of their disapplication that their 
"objectives" were met by the legislative process. The Court was 
careful not to endorse the very wide formulae, used by the two 
Advocates General in Boxus and Nomarchiaki, which suggested close 
scrutiny by national judges of the legislative process to see whether 
"the people's elected representatives" had been able "properly" to 
examine and debate the proposal or had "perform[ed] their 
democratic function correctly and effectively". [Para 201] 
There was, they wrote a good general reason for this.  
Whatever other adjustments in meaning it might make by way of 
interpretation, the Court was here concerned with the fundamental 
institutions of national democracy in Europe. It was concerned with 
a provision which deliberately distinguished projects approved by 
legislative process from projects approved by the ordinary planning 
process. It is not conceivable, and it would not be consistent with 
the principle of mutual trust which underpins the Union, that the 
Council of Ministers should, when legislating, have envisaged the 
close scrutiny of the operations of Parliamentary democracy 
suggested by the words used by Advocates General Sharpston and 
Kokott. The Court will also have been well aware of the principles 
of separation of powers and mutual internal respect which govern 
the relations between different branches of modern democracies (as 
to which see, in the United Kingdom context, R (Jackson) v Attorney 
General [2005] UKHL 56; [2006] 1 AC 262, (para 125, per Lord 
Hope of Craighead).59 The Court cannot have overlooked or 
                                                          
59 I write on this case in ‘The United Kingdom in Europe and Europe in the United Kingdom – 
an Indelible Influence’ in Verfassung und Verwaltung in Europa  eds U Becker, A Hatje, M Potacs, 
N Wunderlich, Nomos Baden-Baden pp 19-42 (2014). 
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intended to destabilise these. In a not so dissimilar context, the 
German Federal Constitutional Court noted in its judgment of 24 
April 2013 – 1 BvR 1215/07, (para 91) – that decisions of the 
European Court of Justice must be understood in the context of the 
cooperative relationship ("Im Sinne eines kooperativen 
Miteinanders") which exists between that Court and a national 
constitutional court such as the Bundesverfassungsgericht or a 
supreme court like this Court.  
The judges wrote of the interpretation given to the European Communities Act 
1972, which requires United Kingdom courts to acknowledge that European law 
requires them to treat domestic statutes, whether passed before or after the 1972 
Act, as invalid ‘if and to the extent that they cannot be interpreted consistently 
with European law’ and they cite R v Secretary of State, Ex p Factortame Ltd (No 2) 
(above).  
[Factortame] was a significant development, recognising the special 
status of the 1972 Act and of European law and the importance 
attaching to the United Kingdom and its courts fulfilling the 
commitment to give loyal effect to European law. But it is difficult to 
see how an English [I add ‘sic’] court could fully comply with the 
approach suggested by the two Advocates General without addressing 
its apparent conflict with other principles hitherto also regarded as 
fundamental and enshrined in the Bill of Rights. Scrutiny of the 
workings of Parliament and whether they satisfy externally imposed 
criteria clearly involves questioning and potentially impeaching (i.e. 
condemning) Parliament's internal proceedings, and would go a 
considerable step further than any United Kingdom court has ever 
gone. [202] 
They then make the following crucially significant statement: 
The United Kingdom has no written constitution, but we have a 
number of constitutional instruments. They include Magna Carta, the 
Petition of Right 1628, the Bill of Rights and (in Scotland) the Claim 
of Rights Act 1689, the Act of Settlement 1701 and the Act of Union 
1707. The European Communities Act 1972, the Human Rights Act 
1998 and the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 may now be added to 
this list. The common law itself also recognises certain principles as 
fundamental to the rule of law. It is, putting the point at its lowest, 
certainly arguable (and it is for United Kingdom law and courts to 
determine) that there may be fundamental principles, whether 
contained in other constitutional instruments or recognised at 
common law, of which Parliament when it enacted the European 
Communities Act 1972 did not either contemplate or authorise the 
abrogation. [207] 
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They do not express a view as to whether Article 9 of the Bill of Rights would be 
one such constitutional provision (the author’s view is that it would be such 
because of its protection of the UK’s version of the separation the of powers). 
The point was not argued and was raised by the court itself, not counsel.  They 
refer to the ‘important insights’ and ‘penetrating discussion’ by Sir John Laws in 
Thoburn (paras 58-70) on the belief that constitutional statutes may only be 
repealed expressly or by ‘irresistible wording’. But it is contestable that there are 
in addition to constitutional statutes constitutional principles of the common law 
such as those developed by the courts and which we referred to above: legality, 
transparency, access to justice, freedom of speech and so on. The courts have 
accepted that these principles may only be overridden by express, clearly worded 
statutes. Parliament must then face the consequences.60  
HS2 makes it clear, it certainly strongly suggests, that UK law is likely to baulk at 
directly effective provisions of EU law overriding basic constitutional 
instruments, constitutional statutes or constitutional principles of the common 
law. Subject to that, the contractual/voluntary basis of supremacy, the 
arguments from functionality, equality and analytical models will give supremacy 
to EU law as Craig explains.61 We await the views of the ECJ on such matters 
although its case law would indicate a contrary opinion to the Supreme Court 
justices.62 Such occurrences are going to be extremely rare – HS2 is the first case 
on such a question in almost 42 years in the UK. It should be recalled that in 
Factortame, the ruling of which the Supreme Court endorsed, the House of Lords 
found that liability under the ECJ ruling had been established and damages had to 
be paid to the victims by HM government.63  
 
The decision in Pham v Secretary of State for the Home Department ([2015] UKSC 19) 
gave an early opportunity for the Supreme Court to revisit arguments about 
national constitutional space being a matter for domestic constitutional law. Lord 
Mance, with whom Lords Neuberger and Wilson and Lady Hale agreed – from a 
court of seven- argued that questions of national citizenship were a matter of 
constitutional law and fell within the rubric of national constitutional law despite 
the possibility of contingent EU citizen rights. In a nutshell what Mance argues is 
that an Act of Parliament (the 1972 Act) cannot be taken to have signed away 
complete sovereignty. HS2 recognised ‘jurisdictional limits’ on the extent to 
which an Act of Parliament could confer on the EUECJ competence to adjudicate 
                                                          
60 See Lord Hoffmann in Simms note 50 above. 
61 P.Craig (2014) Public Law 373. 
62 The decision in Case C-399/11 Melloni (26/02/2013) would seem to support the classic 
jurisprudence of the ECJ on EU law supremacy or primacy as now referred to in Declaration 
No 17 of the Lisbon Treaty and see opinion of the Council Legal Service (11197/07 (JUR 
260, 22 June 2007)).  
63 R v Secretary of State for Transport ex p Factortame Ltd [1999] 4 All ER 906 (HL). 
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on ‘fundamental features of the British constitution’. The TEU he argues in Arts 
4 and 5 recognises conferral of competences with limitations, respect for 
fundamental national constitutional structures in Art 4(2) and principles that 
govern use of Union competences. Like HS2 the relevant passage is obiter dicta. 
The relevant paragraphs (75-83) do raise difficult questions about where national 
constitutional space begins and EU primacy ends. What if there are twenty-eight 
different answers? 
 
This is the point addressed by Advocate General Cruz Villalón in his Opinion in 
Case C-62/14 (14 January 2015) concerning the reference by Germany’s 
Constitutional Court to the CJEU on the legality of outright monetary 
transactions. That case concerned the not inconsiderable difficulty of subjecting 
EU law’s validity to the ‘unalterable core content of the national constitution’ 
(para 34). While making an Art 267 reference, the national court does not wish 
to relinquish ‘its own ultimate responsibility to state what the law is with regard 
to the constitutional conditions and limits of European integration so far as its 
own state is concerned’ (para 49). The ECJ has long worked with a category of 
‘constitutional traditions common’ to all member states and in establishing a 
culture of rights for the Union – a constitutional culture. He continues 
 
‘That common constitutional culture can be seen as part of the common 
identity of the Union, with the important consequence, to my mind, that 
the constitutional identity of each Member State, which of course is 
specific to the extent necessary, cannot be regarded, to state matters 
cautiously, as light years away from that common constitutional culture. 
Rather, a clearly understood, open, attitude to EU law should in the 
medium and long term give rise, as a principle, to basic convergence 
between the constitutional identity of the Union and that of each of the 
Member States.’ (para 61).  
 
Sincere cooperation, trust and, one may add, tolerance are the key factors in 
constitutional co-existence and ultimate convergence as he sees the position. We 
should recall however that in its Opinion on accession to the ECHR the CJEU 
has emphatically confirmed the autonomy and exclusive nature of EU law and 
over which the court is the mandated and sole interpreter (Opinion 2/13, 18 
December 2014). 
 
In response to claims that the UK agreed to the treaties and these were ratified 
by domestic constitutional processes, it must be recalled that treaties do not 
change the law of the UK and the courts’ focus is on their implementing 
measures although treaties may be referred to to aid construction. The court’s 
attention is on what the 1972 Act has authorised; it is not focused upon a written 
constitution because there is no such thing in the UK. It is not focused on what 
the government has agreed to by way of treaty. The discussion on 
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constitutionality in HS2 and Pham is strictly obiter dicta because in HS2 the court 
ruled that there had been compliance with the EIA Directive despite the 
interpretation of the Advocates General and in Pham it was not necessary to 
determine the constitutional issue.  
 
There was no need for a reference under Art 267 TFEU in HS2 despite the lack 
of clarity in the ECJ decisions and Advocate Generals opinions. Failing to make 
Article 267 references has been a prominent development in Supreme Court case 
law in recent years, even to the point of arguing that the ECJ has been in error in 
its analysis (Aimia Coalition n 32 above). 
 
I do not think the Supreme Court is simply being ‘rebellious’ in this. They are far 
more active in judicial interpretation of the constitution than was thought 
possible in 1972. Problems of interpretation have been identified as the common 
law process develops.  
Arguably, if courts in the UK are determined that they resolve basic matters of 
UK constitutional law and ultimate sovereignty they may be prepared to go 
further and issue a declaration of unconstitutionality against provisions in a UK 
statute affecting domestic law only which denied human rights and which were in 
extremis.64 Courts may possibly refuse to enforce such provisions. This would not 
make them legislators. They are too respectful for that and know that is not their 
role in the UK constitution. They would not invalidate primary legislation. 
Relationships between the courts and Parliament are generally cooperative and 
constructive. The scenario of such judicial action would be indicative of 
something going dreadfully wrong. But it would make the judges respecters and 
upholders of fundamental rights if rights were subverted at the legislative level. 
Constitutional statutes and constitutional principles of the common law are a 
higher order of law. The common law says so.65 
Conclusion 
 
Lord Reed has observed in the Thomas More lecture in October 201466 that  
                                                          
64 See Political and Constitutional Reform Committee House of Commons HC 802 (2013-14) 
on the role of the judiciary in the UK in a codified constitution. This would extend beyond the 
remedies available under the Human Rights Act 1998. 
65 P. Birkinshaw and M. Varney ‘Britain Alone Constitutionally’ in P. Birkinshaw and A. 
Biondi Britain Alone! The Consequences and Implications of UK Exit from Europe (2015) forthcoming 
Kluwer Law International. 
66 
http://www.lincolnsinn.org.uk/images/word/education/euro/EU_Law_and
_the_Supreme_Court.pdf 
Thomas More was a great European. He did not accept the King (Henry VIII) as 
head of the Church, an act of treason for which he was beheaded. 
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‘One of the greatest challenges currently facing courts at the apex of 
national legal systems throughout Europe is to understand their role 
in an era when law is permeated by rules and principles falling 
within the domain of supranational courts at Strasbourg and 
Luxembourg and to establish a successful working relationship with 
those courts. It is a challenge not because of any lack of goodwill or 
effort on either side, but because it inevitably takes time for 
everyone involved to adjust to such a major change [41 years the 
author adds!] particularly during a period when the EU is 
undergoing development and it is uncertain where the development 
will lead.’ 
 
The ECJ cannot micro-manage, he argues. Its role must be interlocking with 
national courts but it must be based on mutual respect and a common 
understanding of their respective roles. He clearly sees a role for diminishing 
resort to the Art 267 reference procedure. But says Lord Reed, ‘I do not wish to 
argue that the arguments put forward by the ECJ on primacy of EU law are 
anything other than ‘relevant and important’.67 But that does not ‘entail that 
every rule of EU law has to take priority over basic rules of national constitutional 
law.’68 
 
A 267 reference in HS2 would have involved investigation into national 
constitutional law and the possibility that Art 9 Bill of Rights should be 
overridden – then Parliament (as distinct from government) would very likely 
have sought relief that the ECJ judgment should not be enforced.69 Furthermore, 
too often he feels, the ECJ has not respected the democratic intent of the EU 
legislature breaching legal certainty and failing to respect the compromises and 
concessions that are an inevitable feature of democratic decision-making. He 
echoes the points made by Lord Mance set out above. 
 
In sum there is a need for more ‘Judicial Discourse’. We have seen this in 
relation to the CHR and our national courts in subjects such as the English law of 
negligence, banning of political advertising on TV, convictions based on hearsay 
evidence and what is interpreted as a concession to the UK strength of feeling on 
prisoner voting rights.70 There are regular meetings with Supreme Court and 
senior justices and counterparts in top courts in Europe and regular citations of 
                                                          
67 Ibid P 8. 
68 P 9. 
69 P 10 
70 Firth v United Kingdom (12 August 2014 CHR 4th Section) on the latter. See R 
(Haney etc) v Secretary of State for Justice etc [2014] UKSC 66 and refusal to follow parts of James v 
United Kingdom [2012] EHRR 399 on Article 5 ECHR. 
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national case law in our courts. There has to be fostered a true spirit of 
cooperation and joint endeavour.  
 
But the emphasis has to be on a two way process; not one way traffic. UK judges 
are suspicious of what they see as over-strained interpretation of EU laws by the 
ECJ and interpretations which fail to respect the democratic legislator’s 
intentions, undermine legal certainty and which ‘fail to respect the compromises 
and concessions between different interests which have to be respected in a 
stable European Union.’71 It makes agreement in the legislative process more 
difficult, and consequently more difficult for courts to apply the acte clair 
doctrine.  
 
I will conclude by expressing my belief that our judges are sincere in their desire 
for constructive cooperation; this surely lies at the heart of Art 4(2) and (3) 
TEU. Lord Mance in his judgment in Pham that we examined above spoke of the 
‘spirit of cooperation’ on constitutional matters shown by both the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht and the UK Supreme Court.  (Para  91). 
 
UK judges respect and cooperate with the ECJ; but they are also conscious of 
their new-found responsibility to uphold and interpret ‘our constitution’. As I 
said, they have been sedulously establishing the extent of the common law 
constitution. They acknowledge they are part of a Gerichtsverbund. It is not on the 
whole with our judges that Euroscepticism lies. It lies with many politicians who 
despise the European enterprise. Neuberger makes a telling point:  
  
‘Studying judgments of the CJEU and CHR has led to the courts of 
this country [UK] taking a more principled approach to decision-
making than in the past. This is scarcely surprising: .... the common 
law has tended to be pragmatic and therefore very ready to 
incorporate good ideas from other systems.’72 
 
The common law has, to put it bluntly, begged, stolen and borrowed. It is much 
richer for the European experience. That with respect is the common law’s 
strength. This ‘more principled’ approach would not have occurred without our 
exposure to European legal experience. My book European Public Law [2014] is 
dedicated to understanding this phenomenon.  
 
                                                          
71 P 11. 
72 Note 1 above para 46. 
